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Abstract
This article in three parts offers the beginnings of a postcolonial critique of mainstream 
International Relations (IR). The first part argues that IR, where it has been interested in history 
at all, has misdescribed the origins and character of the contemporary international order, and 
that an accurate understanding of the ‘expansion of the international system’ requires attention 
to its colonial origins. The second part suggests that IR is deeply Eurocentric, not only in its 
historical account of the emergence of the modern international order, but also in its account(s) 
of the nature and functioning of this order. The human sciences are heirs to a tradition of 
knowledge which defines knowledge as a relation between a cognising, representing subject and 
an object, such that knowledge is always ‘of’ something out there, which exists independently of 
its apprehension. The third part of the article suggests that knowledges serve to constitute that 
which they purport to merely cognise or represent, and that IR theory serves to naturalise that 
which is historically produced.
Keywords
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This is an article by someone whose interests in philosophy, Indian history and postcolo-
nial theory make an engagement with ‘the international’ both mandatory and rewarding. 
But in seeking to ‘think’ the international and the global, I find that turning to the disci-
pline of International Relations (IR) – or at any rate to the mainstream of the discipline, 
in which I include the English School – is not of great help, and is often a hindrance. This 
article is, therefore, a postcolonial critique of mainstream IR. There have been many 
critiques of IR – constructivist, feminist, poststructuralist and others; this journal has 
been one of the main fora where such intellectual dissent has been nourished. I draw 
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freely from such critiques, and some of the issues raised and the points argued in this 
article have been highlighted by others who do not write under the aegis of postcolonial 
theory.1 What is nonetheless distinctive about the critique offered here is that it seeks to 
systematically ‘provincialise Europe’ – in a threefold sense: it challenges the centrality 
accorded to Europe as the historical source and origin of the international order; it que-
ries the universality accorded to moral and legal perspectives which reflect and repro-
duce the power relations characteristic of the colonial encounter, and which are thus far 
from being universal; and it questions the epistemological privilege accorded to an 
understanding of knowledge which is blind to the constitutive, and not merely represen-
tational, role of knowledge. The article does not offer a better way of ‘doing’ IR. Indeed, 
criticisms imply alternatives, but here I principally offer a postcolonial critique of the 
discipline, not a postcolonial way of practising it. 
In the first part of the article I argue that mainstream IR, where it has been interested 
in history at all, has misdescribed the origins and character of the contemporary interna-
tional order, and that an accurate understanding of the ‘expansion of the international 
system’ requires attention to its colonial origins. In the second part I suggest that main-
stream IR is deeply Eurocentric, not only in its historical account of the emergence of the 
modern international order, but also in its account(s) of the nature and functioning of this 
order. The third part of the article addresses the human sciences as heirs to a tradition of 
knowledge which defines knowledge as a relation between a cognising, representing 
subject and an object, such that knowledge is always ‘of’ something out there, which 
exists independently of its apprehension. What this overlooks is that knowledges serve 
to constitute that which they purport to merely cognise or represent, and that IR theory 
serves to naturalise that which is historically produced. By the logic of my own argu-
ment, the same is true of other knowledges, such as liberal political theory; the difference 
is that whereas the unitary, rational individual of liberal political theory has almost 
assumed the status of an axiom, testifying to the success of historical processes, and of 
discourses (not least liberal political theory itself), in naturalising the individual, the 
naturalisation of the nation-state and the world order is much less secure. This is pre-
cisely what makes ‘the international’ an interesting and revealing sphere of investigation, 
and one that can and should be integrated into wider philosophical and ethical debates; 
but inasmuch as mainstream IR scholarship serves as the agent of such naturalisation, it 
obscures rather than illuminates what is interesting about the international. 
History
A great deal of IR displays little interest in history, for history is unimportant if the defin-
ing feature of the international order is considered to be the transhistorical fact of ‘anar-
chy’. Kenneth Waltz writes that ‘the enduring anarchic character of international politics 
accounts for the striking sameness in the quality of international life through the millennia’.2 
Waltz recognises that there have been differing international systems in the course of the 
 1. In addition to works cited in the footnotes, I have been influenced by work by – and, in some cases, 
conversations with – Sankaran Krishna, Barry Hindess, Mustapha Pasha, Naeem Inayatullah, David 
Blaney, Andrew Linklater, Branwen Gruffydd Jones and Mike Shapiro, amongst others.
 2. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), 66.
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millennia, differing according to whether their primary political units were city-states, 
empires or nations, but different ‘[i]nternational-political systems, like economic mar-
kets, are individualist in origin, spontaneously generated, and unintentional’.3 Thus, not 
only is history not necessary, given that the fundamental nature of international life has 
changed little over ‘millennia’; it would in any case be difficult to construct an intelligi-
ble account of historical change in the international arena. For Waltz, as for many other 
realists and neo-realists, reasoning: 
starts from the premise that there are at any time a multiplicity of states and domestic societies, 
where the paradigmatic differences between … domestic society and [international] anarchy 
are not questioned but simply assimilated as part of the premise … analysts are [therefore] able 
to conclude that modern international politics exhibits a sameness that is basic to its history. 
International politics appears as no more and no less than an eternal struggle of multiple 
sovereign states in anarchy.4
There are, however, those in the discipline who, even when they see anarchy as the defin-
ing feature of the international order, are nonetheless interested in how this historically 
evolved, and how an order which, in their account, first developed in Europe in the early- 
modern period came to encompass the globe. I refer of course to the ‘English School’, 
which has the considerable merit of enquiring into the historical origins of the contem-
porary international system.
However, as I argue below, the account of the ‘expansion of international society’ 
offered by the English School is Eurocentric and mistaken. And if even the historically 
sensitive elements in mainstream IR offer a mistakenly Eurocentric account of history, 
then one can begin to understand why the discipline is not of much help for those from 
other disciplines who seek its aid to better understand the origins and workings of the 
international order.
Adam Watson’s detailed discussion of The Evolution of International Society partly 
grew out of the studies and papers of the British Committee on the Theory of 
International Politics, of which he had been a key member. It contains chapters on the 
state systems and empires of Sumer, Assyria, Persia, India, China and elsewhere, 
before arriving at an account of ‘European international society’. In Watson’s account, 
 3. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 91.
 4. Richard Ashley, ‘The Powers of Anarchy: Theory, Sovereignty, and the Domestication of Global Life’, 
in International Theory: Critical Investigations, ed. James Der Derian (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), 
115, emphasis in original. This is why where history does figure in IR texts, it is often little more than 
an illustrative device, for which purpose a paragraph or two on the Peloponnesian War and a thumbnail 
sketch of the Peace of Augsburg and the treaty of Westphalia take us rapidly to the modern world order. A 
similar history of political thought, usually featuring Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant 
and sometimes others, provides a genealogy to a young discipline seeking distinguished forefathers – even 
if it requires readings so unfettered by any sense of historical context, and so unburdened by any textual 
evidence, that they should make any serious scholar blush. But as Walker observes, these are not histories 
of political thought, but rather accounts of ‘an ahistorical repetition in which the struggles of these thinkers 
to make sense of the historical transformations in which they were caught are erased in favor of assertions 
that they all articulate essential truths about the same unchanging and usually tragic reality: the eternal 
game of relations between states’ – R.B.J. Walker, ‘History and Structure in the Theory of International 
Relations’, in International Theory, ed. Der Derian, 322.
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this began to emerge around the early 16th century and was more or less formalised 
with the Westphalia settlement. It then spread beyond its original home, in an uncoor-
dinated but orderly fashion: ‘the members of the European society regulated their 
expansion between themselves, from the first orderly partition of the transatlantic 
world between Spain and Portugal down to the 19th-century arrangements for Africa, 
Oceania and Asia which avoided the colonial wars between Europeans that had previ-
ously marked their expansion’.5 The spread was both necessitated and enabled by the 
Industrial Revolution, which gave Europe economic and technological superiority 
relative to other parts of the world, as well as a more general sense of superiority vis-
à-vis these others. Europeans, Watson writes, ‘wanted to use their superiority to 
Europeanize and modernize the non-European world, to bring “progress” to it’;6 
whether non-Europeans welcomed or disliked the Europeans, they were deeply 
impressed and ‘found it difficult to resist what the Europeans had to offer’.7 Increasing 
numbers of non-European rulers sought to join the European society of states, and 
while initially they were rebuffed, and the criteria of ‘civilisation’ was used to exclude 
them, eventually Europe and the US decided that ‘all other independent states should 
be admitted to their international society on the same terms as themselves’.8 
Decolonisation, according to Watson, brought the undisputed dominance of European 
powers to an end, and a new, non-discriminatory global society came into being, albeit 
one which ‘inherited its organization and most of its concepts from its European 
predecessor’.9
Buzan and Little offer a similar, if more sophisticated (and less self-satisfied), account 
in International Systems in World History. Here, they seek to document and explore the 
many non-European state systems that preceded the present one, a task that they see as 
necessary in order to avoid ‘Eurocentricism’,10 something that they claim has been 
avoided by the English School,11 on whose ideas they draw. They conclude that: 
the standard model [of what they term ‘American’ IR] assumes that international systems 
are composed of a number of units amongst which contact is direct, and processes include 
diplomacy, war and trade.… Its Eurocentric vision underpins most of IR theory, and makes 
sense for most of the modern era. But its unconscious linkage to that particular patch of 
history means … that it is incapable of dealing with both past and future international 
systems.12
 5. Watson finds the collaboration of the great powers during the Boxer rebellion in China especially 
noteworthy. Admittedly, the great powers violated the independence of China, but they did so in the name 
of the international community, as the UN was later to do in other ‘chaotic areas’ – The Evolution of 
International Society (London: Routledge, 1992), 272–3.
 6. Watson, Evolution of International Society, 268.
 7. Watson, Evolution of International Society, 268–9.
 8. Watson, Evolution of International Society, 258.
 9. Watson, Evolution of International Society, 300.
10. Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of 
International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 20–1.
11. Buzan and Little, International Systems, 30.
12. Buzan and Little, International Systems, 369.
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The Eurocentrism of IR mars its understanding of past international systems and its 
capacity to comprehend changes that may lie in the future – but its Eurocentric assump-
tions ‘make sense for most of the modern era’ for there is no doubt that the existing 
international system, forged over the preceding few centuries, has its origins in Europe 
and must be understood with reference to a specifically European history. ‘The European 
empires can … be seen as the nursery, or mechanism, by which the political form of the 
modern state was transposed onto the rest of the world’, write Buzan and Little, and since 
‘the modern state is a quintessentially European phenomenon … it is therefore to 
Europe’s story that one has to look to explain it’.13 Thus, while IR is admittedly 
Eurocentric in its understanding of the world, that Eurocentrism is warranted for the mod-
ern period – or as Hedley Bull and Watson had put it 16 years earlier: 
The present international political structure of the world – founded upon the division of 
mankind and of the earth into separate states, their acceptance of one another’s sovereignty, of 
principles of law regulating their coexistence and co-operation, and of diplomatic conventions 
facilitating their intercourse – is, at least in its most basic features, the legacy of Europe’s now 
vanished ascendancy. Because it was in fact Europe and not America, Asia, or Africa that first 
dominated and, in so doing, unified the world, it is not our perspective but the historical record 
itself that can be called Eurocentric.14
What the above accounts all offer is a rather sanitised version of ‘expansion’. Watson’s 
analysis, for instance, is one in which the violent and bloody conquest of the Americas 
appears as an orderly and regulated affair because it avoided colonial wars (between 
Europeans, that is); one in which Europeans subordinated and ruled over other peoples 
because they desired profit, but also because they sought to civilise non-Europeans and 
bring progress to them; an account in which non-Europeans could not help but be 
impressed, such that they sought admission to the exclusive club of European powers; 
how their importuning fell on deaf ears, until eventually Europe and the US relented and 
decided that they should be admitted as equal members; and, the happy dénouement, one 
that saw a new international order come into being, but which was an extension or expan-
sion, rather than a departure from or repudiation of, the originally European society of 
states. An account of a period that includes the bloody conquest of the Americas, the 
transatlantic slave trade, the expropriation and sometimes genocide of indigenous peo-
ples, wars of conquest, land grabs, exploitation and oppression, somehow manages to 
elide much of this history. It also elides the many mass struggles, violent and less violent, 
that constitute the history of decolonisation – a history that here has only one powerful 
actor, the white man, who eventually comes to see that the very principles of his club 
mandate inclusion rather than exclusion. 
But let us not dismiss Watson’s account, or other similar if less egregious accounts of 
the ‘expansion of international society’, on ‘polemical’ grounds, for there are other 
grounds for doing so. This narrative of the expansion of political forms is modelled on 
the conventional account of the expansion of economic and social forms, that is, of the 
13. Buzan and Little, International Systems, 246.
14. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, ‘Introduction’, in The Expansion of International Society, eds Bull and 
Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 2.
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spread of capitalism (or modernity). This conventional account, which informs many 
disciplines and is deeply ingrained in popular understandings, is one which presumes 
that capitalism began in Europe and later radiated outwards through trade, armies and the 
like. The intellectual task is, then, by definition to identify what was (or came to be) 
distinctive about Europe15 – what cluster of economic or religious or cultural or other 
characteristics, lacking in other parts of the world, enabled Europe to become, in Daniel 
Defert’s phrase, ‘a planetary process rather than a region of the world’.16
For some time now, there have been alternative accounts of the development of capi-
talist modernity, ones in which the development of capitalism and modernity is not a tale 
of endogenous development in Europe, but of structural interconnections between differ-
ent parts of the world that long pre-dated Europe’s ascendance – and that, according to 
some accounts, provided the conditions for that ascendance.17 Others, also dissenting 
from the conventional account, have not sought a grand alternative explanation, but have 
rather sought to show that the ‘great divergence’ between the West and the rest happened 
much later than the conventional narrative would have it, and due to historical exigencies 
rather than any trait or cluster of traits exceptional to Europe; once meaningful compari-
sons are made, the factors commonly thought to be unique to European history can be 
seen to have been present in parts of Asia.18 What is significant for my purposes is not 
which, if any, of these accounts of the development and growth of capitalist modernity is 
accurate, but rather that the conventional account of the rise of capitalist modernity has 
been challenged by those who have noted that trade was not confined to inter-European 
trade, that the conquest of the Americas – and the influx of gold and silver which 
followed – was a factor in the development of capitalism in Europe, and that the supply 
of raw materials from the colonies, and the existence of captive colonial markets for 
European manufactured goods, also played a part – in short, that Europe’s relations with 
the world outside Europe may be relevant. 
15. ‘Much of modern social science’, as Kenneth Pomeranz observes, ‘originated in efforts by late nineteenth 
and twentieth century Europeans to understand what made the economic development path of western 
Europe unique’ – K. Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern 
World Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 3.
16. Quoted in Mary L. Pratt, ‘Scratches on the Face of the Country: Or, What Mr. Burrow Saw in the Land of 
the Bushmen’, Critical Inquiry 12, no. 1 (1995): 125.
17. Andre Gunder Frank, for instance, writes that: ‘Europe did not pull itself up by its own economic 
bootstraps, and certainly not thanks to any kind of European “exceptionalism” of rationality, institutions, 
entrepreneurship, technology … instead Europe used its American money to muscle in on and benefit from 
Asian production, markets, trade – in a word, to profit from the predominant position of Asia in the world 
economy’ – Andre Gunder Frank, ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1998), 4–5. See also John Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Jack Goody, The East in the West (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996); J.M. Blaut, The Colonizer’s Model of the World: Geographical 
Diffusionism and Eurocentric History (New York: Guilford Press, 1993); Gurminder Bhambra, Rethinking 
Modernity: Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
18. See, inter alia, Pomeranz, The Great Divergence; Roy Bin Wong, China Transformed: Historical Change 
and the Limits of Western Experience (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); and various works 
by Sanjay Subrahmanyam, including ‘Connected Histories – Notes towards a Reconfiguration of Early 
Modern Eurasia’, Modern Asian Studies 31, no. 3 (July 1997).
 at Goldsmiths College Library on December 28, 2011mil.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Seth 173
The ‘expansion of international society’ narrative, which in virtually all particulars fol-
lows the conventional account of the rise and spread of capitalist modernity – first the 
West, then the rest – has, however, not been seriously challenged or questioned. A rare 
exception within IR observes: ‘At the same time that the “Westphalian system” of equally 
and mutually independent territorially sovereign states was taking shape, quite different 
colonial and imperial systems were being established beyond Europe’;19 ‘the fundamental 
normative principles of the colonial and imperial systems beyond Europe’ were not equal-
ity and sovereignty, but rather ‘sovereignty should be divided across national and territo-
rial borders as required to develop commerce and to promote what Europeans and 
Americans saw as good government’.20 Just as the period that saw the development of 
capitalism coincided with colonial conquest and trade, so too did the events and processes 
privileged in the conventional account of IR – the peace of Augsburg and the settlement 
of Westphalia – roughly coincide with the subjugation and settlement of the Americas, the 
rise of the slave trade, the founding of the British East India Company and the Dutch East 
India Company, Macartney’s mission to the Middle Kingdom, and so on. The 19th- 
century heyday of this European international system is also the period of the race for colo-
nies, the carving up of Africa and the development of political forms of rule such as man-
dates, paramountcy, concessions and franchises, spheres of interest and influence, 
protectorates, and so on. Could it really be that none of these processes significantly shaped 
the development of the international order – that all these events were happening ‘offstage’ 
and did not shape the main dramatic narrative – or is this omission the result of bad staging?21
An example, or parallel, might help clarify what is at issue. For a generation, feminist 
scholars have been pointing out that the denial of rationality, suffrage and equality to 
women did not only mean that they were ‘excluded’: women were, after all, very much 
there. This denial of political rights was not simply an exclusion that was later remedied 
by inclusion; rather it shaped the nature of modern political thought and modern polities. 
The political orders being established in the 18th and 19th centuries were decisively 
shaped by the fact that they did not extend political rights to women, and by the reasons 
why, and the mechanisms by which, such rights were denied. Or another example – the 
whites of urban South Africa were frequently ignorant about what happened in the black 
shanty towns of apartheid South Africa; indeed, they were sometimes barely aware of 
their existence, even if their household labour was drawn from these areas. But the shanty 
towns were never the concern only of those who lived there, and those who policed them; 
their existence was closely tied up with, and served to shape (just as they were in turn 
shaped by), the prosperous white suburbs whose denizens were so blissfully unaware of 
the existence of the shanty towns and their inhabitants. 
19. Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 97.
20. Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society, 98.
21. Keene makes a very similar point in his discussion of Hedley Bull’s claim that the fact of European 
dominance means that any understanding of international society should concentrate on the emergence 
of a European society of states. Keene rejects this claim on the grounds that it is a non sequitur. Since 
‘European dominance was primarily exercised through practices of colonialism and imperialism’, if ‘the 
fact of European dominance ought to dictate what our research program on order in modern world politics 
should be, it directs us away from the European states-system, not towards it’ – Beyond the Anarchical 
Society, 28, emphasis in original.
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Analogously, it seems reasonable to presume, given that there was extensive contact 
between post-Westphalian Europe and the non-European world, and given that European 
colonialism operated through a diversity of often novel political forms, that all this was 
not unrelated to, and had some impact upon, the political forms and inter-state relations 
evolving in Europe. Thus, any satisfactory account of the emergence of the modern inter-
national system cannot simply chart how an international society that developed in the 
West radiated outwards, but rather needs to explore the ways in which international soci-
ety was shaped by the interactions between Europe and those it colonised. In this regard, 
any satisfactory account would be a postcolonial one.
The ‘post’ in postcolonialism, let it be noted, is not a periodisation that signals the begin-
ning of an era where colonialism is part of the past; on the contrary, it signifies the claim that 
conquest, colonialism and empire are not a footnote or episode in a larger story, such as that 
of capitalism, modernity or the expansion of international society, but are in fact a central 
part of that story and are constitutive of it. The ‘post’ does not mark the period after the 
colonial era, but rather the effects of this era in shaping the world that is ours. This world was 
not born out of the West having an impact upon and ‘awakening’ a dormant non-West, but 
out of both of these being constituted in the course of multifarious (unequal, hierarchical and 
usually coercive) exchanges, such that neither was left untouched. As Stuart Hall puts it: 
Since the Sixteenth Century, these different temporalities and histories have been irrevocably 
and violently yoked together.… Their grossly unequal trajectories, which formed the very 
ground of political antagonism and cultural resistance, have nevertheless been impossible to 
disentangle, conceptualise or narrate as discrete entities: though that is precisely what the 
dominant western historiographical tradition has often tried to do. No site, either ‘here’ or 
‘there’, in its fantasied autonomy and in-difference, could develop without taking into account 
its significant and/or abjected others. The very notion of an autonomous, self-produced and 
self-identical cultural identity, like that of a self-sufficient economy or absolutely sovereign 
polity, had in fact to be discursively constructed in and through ‘the Other’.… The Other ceased 
to be a term fixed in place and time external to the system of identification and became, instead, 
a symbolically marked ‘constitutive outside’.22
For some decades now, a burgeoning scholarship – some of it undertaken under the 
sign of postcolonial theory, some not – has sought to explore the ways in which litera-
ture, sexuality, politics and political theory, science, and much else besides in the West, 
were affected, and sometimes decisively shaped, by colonialism and empire. The same, 
I suggest, needs to be done for any account of the emergence of international society. 
Culture and Theory
Stuart Hall, whom I quoted above, goes on to write: 
colonization so refigured the terrain that, ever since, the very idea of a world of separate 
identities, of isolated or separable and self-sufficient cultures and economies, has been obliged 
22. Stuart Hall, ‘When Was “The Post-Colonial”: Thinking at the Limit’, in The Post-Colonial Question, eds 
I. Chambers and L. Curti (London: Routledge, 1996), 252.
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to yield to a variety of paradigms designed to capture these different but related forms of 
relationship, interconnection and discontinuity.23
Even if its historical account is suspect, IR, precisely as a function of the fact that it deals 
with the globe and with ‘relations’, is well placed to be one of those paradigms. In fact, 
as I argue in this section, it signally fails to be so. 
IR realist and neo-realist strands of scholarship are not interested in questions of cul-
ture and culturally derived notions of what counts as morality. Since states simply exist, 
and by their nature pursue their interests, or else are compelled to do so by the systemic 
and structural circumstances of anarchy, the rules that govern state interaction are not 
seen to have anything to do with culture. Culture belongs to disciplines other than IR. In 
seeking to interrogate the place of culture and difference in mainstream IR, I therefore 
once again turn to those influenced by the English School, because the English School at 
least recognises that the question of culture is central to, rather than peripheral to, inter-
national politics.
Robert Jackson’s The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States makes 
an eloquent argument for the achievements of international society, which he character-
ises as a covenant that recognises and respects cultural and moral diversity, while avoid-
ing many of its potentially unhappy effects. Like Bull, Watson and Buzan and Little, 
Jackson regards the international order as originating in Europe and gradually becoming 
globalised from the second half of the 19th century. In contrast to earlier systems, which 
excluded many as ‘barbarians’, ‘savages’ and the like, this order ‘is horizontal rather than 
hierarchical, inclusive rather than exclusive, and is based expressly on … pluralist ethics … 
the first bona fide normative discourse that communicates with and accommodates all 
the world’s cultures and civilizations: human political diversity on a global scale’.24 Here 
we have an account that, even if (in my terms) it gets its history wrong, is sensitive to 
difference, treating it as an inescapable fact and even as something of ethical value. The 
question confronted by this new order, according to Jackson, was this: given the irreduc-
ible heterogeneity of the world’s people, but given also that these peoples interact in 
numerous ways, they ‘are going to have to find some mutually intelligible and mutually 
acceptable, or adequate, terms upon which they can conduct their relations.… These 
terms must go beyond existing cultures and civilizations.’25 That is, the rules governing 
their interactions must be acceptable to all, without being those ‘of’ any constituent.
This is the problem to which equal state sovereignty, self-determination and non-
intervention are the solution. These allow each constituent to choose and pursue its own 
‘domestic’ way of life, while providing norms and rules for their interaction. These are 
procedural rules rather than substance, mere form rather than content. In Jackson’s 
words, international law and diplomatic practice allow for interaction between ‘the vari-
ous political systems of a large and highly diverse planetary population’, but do not 
‘require that statespeople must necessarily share deeper assumptions regarding social 
morality or political culture that are characteristic of particular civilizations, such as that 
23. Hall, ‘When Was “The Post-Colonial”’, in The Post-Colonial Question, eds Chambers and Curti, 252–3.
24. Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 14.
25. Jackson, The Global Covenant, 14–15.
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of the West, or that of East Asia, or that of the Muslim world’.26 ‘Content’ lies on the side 
of the individual states, each of which is different; ‘procedure’ governs their interactions, 
belongs to no one in particular and thus can be accepted by all.
The problem Jackson poses for relations between states or peoples is a problem as old 
as the 17th and 18th centuries: once people were conceived of as free individuals, each 
possessed of his own property, religion, desires, goals and interests, how were they to 
interact with each other in a public domain, amicably if possible, but with principles to 
regulate their interaction and resolve conflict where this was not possible? The revolu-
tions of 1776 and 1789 resolved this dilemma by means of a distinction between form and 
content, substance and procedure. As Marx brilliantly demonstrated in On the Jewish 
Question, the private now became the locus of particularity and content, while the public 
and political was constituted as a domain of formal and procedural rules regulating the 
interaction of individuals, but devoid of any content or particularity, blind to particulari-
ties such as religion and property, and partaking of none of them. Thus, the modern politi-
cal order was begun, and liberalism, the champion of this insurgent order, and its official 
face once it was triumphant, began its long career. However, this answer or solution was 
beset by problems from the beginning, and so too is the international version of it.
In the realm of what IR calls ‘domestic’ political theory, one problem was that the 
purely ‘procedural’ was in fact highly substantive and normative; far from being neutral, 
as critics pointed out, the procedural norms adopted presupposed, and thus favoured, 
Christian values over other values, men over women and so on.27 The development of 
liberal political theory has in part been a process of seeking to ‘purify’ these procedures 
and norms of their content. Rawlsian liberalism famously invents the ‘original position’ 
and the ‘veil of ignorance’ to demonstrate, upon the foundation of a few minimal pre-
suppositions, that rational individuals would choose procedural rules that favoured no 
one kind of individual or substantive quality or attribute, such as race or wealth. Tellingly, 
in his later work, Rawls finds that even this is not neutral or procedural enough; he 
abjures ‘metaphysical’ in favour of ‘political’ liberalism, an increasingly thin, spare or 
stripped-down liberalism which seeks to avoid presuming and thus privileging even the 
liberal values of individualism and autonomy: for ‘so understood’, writes Rawls, ‘liber-
alism becomes but another sectarian doctrine’.28 But this also, I would suggest, fails, and 
is bound to fail, for there simply are no ‘neutral’ procedural assumptions – all presump-
tions, including (perhaps especially) ones about what it means to be human, to be 
rational and desiring, are historically and culturally produced, and are thus ‘particular’ 
rather than universal.29
26. Jackson, The Global Covenant, 24.
27. For a very influential example of this sort of argument, see Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1988).
28. John Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 14, no. 3 
(1985): 246. See also his Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press), where the later 
position is developed and presented, and also The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1999).
29. On this see Sanjay Seth, ‘Liberalism and the Politics of (Multi)Culture: Or, Plurality Is Not Difference’, 
Postcolonial Studies 4, no. 1 (2001): 65–77.
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What is an insuperable problem for ‘domestic’ political theory is no less so for IR 
theory. Jackson is aware, of course, that the procedural rules he refers to do, in fact, arise 
from a particular historical and socio-cultural setting. International law, he writes, 
‘although European in origin, has been adopted around the world’; and similarly the 
norms and practices of diplomacy are ‘originally European but now universal’.30 We 
have every reason, however, to doubt the ‘universality’ of international law, and to doubt 
that, although originally European, it was cleansed of any cultural particularities and 
became a neutral resource available to all. Antony Anghie finds instead that: ‘Over the 
centuries, international law developed a sophisticated series of technologies, doctrines, 
and disciplines that borrowed in important ways from the broader justifications of colo-
nialism to address the problem of the governance of non-European peoples.’31 And James 
Gathii persuasively argues that this legacy continues to affect the workings of interna-
tional law.32 In any case, ‘widespread’, ‘general’ and even ‘global’ are not the same thing 
as ‘universal’. The ubiquity of a practice or norm tells us nothing about its origins or the 
circumstances under which it was adopted (or imposed). ‘Universal’ suggests not just 
ubiquity, but some sort of transhistorical, transcultural and/or transcendental warrant; it 
is no argument to suggest, as Jackson does, and as Bull and Watson do, that the accept-
ance of these norms/procedures by non-Western states renders these norms/procedures 
universal, purging them of their particularistic, Western origins, any more than the adop-
tion of the mini-skirt by all women (or, for that matter, the burqa) would make these 
‘universal’ features of womanhood. 
As if recognising this, immediately after the passages above Jackson goes on to write:
What statespeople also seem to possess is a common ability to recognize the limits imposed by 
the circumstances under which they must operate in their conduct of foreign policy.… 
Statespeople can reasonably be expected to act with circumspection and prudence.… Prudence 
is not a European or Western virtue; it is a virtue of men and women everywhere.33
This is a rather revealing argument, for it is a last-ditch recourse to a sort of neo-realism – if 
the arguments regarding the neutral character of international law and diplomacy fail to 
persuade, the ‘clincher’ is that state interactions are shaped by the limits imposed by the 
way things are structured, limits which are known by prudential reasoning, which is a 
universal attribute. Revealing, and also unconvincing. ‘Prudence’ can be thought to be a 
universal human attribute, just as marriage can be thought to be a universal feature of all 
societies, if you define it broadly enough. But in some cultures gift-giving is thought 
to be ‘prudent’, while in others it is more prudent to receive than to give, and so on. 
30. Jackson, The Global Covenant, 24.
31. Antony Anghie, ‘Decolonizing the Concept of “Good Governance”’, in Decolonizing International 
Relations, ed. Branwen Gruffydd Jones (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield 2006), 123. See also his 
Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005); and Siba Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns and Africans: Race and Self-Determination in 
International Law (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006).
32. James Gathii, War, Commerce, and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) and 
‘Dispossession through International Law: Iraq in Historical and Comparative Context’, in Decolonizing 
International Relations, ed. Gruffydd Jones, 131–52.
33. Jackson, The Global Covenant, 24.
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Prudence is no more ‘universal’ than international law – it just sounds more universal 
because it is vague.
In short, the difficulties that political theory runs into when trying to equate the pro-
cedural with mere form, devoid of any particularistic content, are also encountered by 
international theory whenever it similarly seeks to acknowledge and yet disavow the 
importance of culture. In fact, this is even more of a problem for IR than for political 
theory. If the claimed universality of procedures or form is equally problematic for both, 
on the other side of the equation, the unit which is thought to be the source and bearer of 
content is especially problematic for IR. It seems intuitively obvious that humans are in 
some sense indivisible individuals, and therefore it is plausible to talk of them having 
desires, needs, interests and the like. In the next section of this article I will suggest that 
even this is only seemingly obvious, and that it is a result of a historical process that has 
naturalised historically produced and therefore particularistic assumptions – but it clearly 
will not do to assume that ‘cultures’ and ‘civilisations’ are unitary beings possessed of ‘a’ 
need, interest and so on. And it is even more problematic to assume, as IR does when it 
tries to reconcile content with form and substance with procedure, that cultures or civili-
sations are isomorphic with nation-states, to assume, in short, that the diversity which is 
here being characterised and valued is embodied or instantiated in and by the 
nation-state.
In Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson argued that nationality was not a fact 
which inevitably led to the world being divided into so many nation-states, but rather that 
both nationality and nation were artefacts. It is a mark of the narrowing of the imagina-
tions of us moderns that to a significant degree we have lost the capacity to imagine 
political community other than in the form of the nation and state.34 Just as for centuries 
after it was gone the Roman Empire continued to dominate the European imagination, so 
for some centuries now our imagination has been dominated by the nation-state. That is 
why, when the colonised resisted, they often (though by no means always)35 did so under 
the banner of nationalism, and sought their emancipation in the form of the sovereign 
nation-state. But since culture, civilisation, language and any of the other features which 
singly or in combination are invoked to define ‘a people’ never, in fact, corresponded to 
the nations which constitute the international order, then ‘imagining’ these in national 
form was always a creative, as well as a coercive, process. ‘Creative’ because a process 
of re-imagining was required; Hindus and Muslims, Gujaratis and Bengalis, low and 
34. On this, see R.B.J. Walker’s important Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). See also Sanjay Seth, ‘A Postcolonial World?’, in 
Contending Images of World Politics, eds Greg Fry and J. O’Hagan (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).
35. There were also anti-colonial movements that imagined a postcolonial future in terms other than those 
of the nation and state. See, for instance, Michael Adas, Prophets of Rebellion: Millenarian Protest 
Movements against the European Colonial Order (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1979); Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1986); Reynaldo Ileto, Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 
1840–1910 (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1989); Sanjay Seth, ‘Rewriting Histories of 
Nationalism: The Politics of “Moderate Nationalism” in Colonial India, 1870–1905’, American Historical 
Review 104, no. 1 (February 1999): 95–116. That these have often been written out of the historical record, 
or else assimilated as precursors or variants of nationalism, is only further testimony to the grip the nation-
state has acquired over us.
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high castes – the many different ways in which the people of the subcontinent had 
conceived of themselves – had, for instance, to start imagining themselves as Indians. 
Nationalism was always a pedagogic process, one which had to posit as a fact (that the 
people in question were a nationality) what was in reality a project designed to produce 
that fact. It was also coercive: inattentive and unruly pupils had to be forced to learn, and 
to submit, so that peasants could be transformed into Frenchmen, Uighers into Chinese, 
Catalans into Spaniards. Precisely because the nation was not the political form that 
cultural community inevitably took in modern times, older forms of identity had now to 
be forced into the new container that was their alleged natural repository or form. In the 
case of some nation-states, this was largely successful; in others, as some of the exam-
ples given above indicate, such imaginings continue to be contested, and are highly con-
tingent and precarious.
With some exceptions – such as the analysts/advocates of conflicts between civilisa-
tions – few scholars actually believe that nation-states instantiate and represent cultures 
and civilisations. This is less a characterisation of how the world is than an attempt to 
make it thus, or say that it must, at any rate, be assumed to be thus. It is one upheld, for 
the most part, by the UN, which continually performs the contradiction of advocating the 
right to self-determination while resolutely defending the territorial integrity and sover-
eignty of the existing nation-states, not only from ‘external’ challenges, but also from 
‘sub-nationalisms’.36 But this does not in any way make nation-states isomorphic with 
‘peoples’ or ‘cultures’, any more than the adoption of international law and diplomacy 
makes these ‘neutral’ procedures.
Knowing and Being
In the preceding section I suggested that cultures/civilisations/peoples – the terms we use 
to connote collectivities whose constituent elements are held together by certain bonds – 
do not ‘map onto’ the nation-states of the world. In any case, we cannot treat collectivi-
ties, whether cultures or nations, as if they were like individuals, even by analogy. But 
this does not mean that individuals are natural, while cultures and nations are historical 
and constructed. We are accustomed to think that the social contract theorists of the 17th 
century awoke to the fact that men are born free, rational and equal, equipped with the 
capacity for willing, desiring and promising. In reality, there was often an anxiety under-
lying the seemingly self-assured pronouncements of these thinkers, an anxiety born of the 
recognition, or half-recognition, that this individual was less a premise that could be 
taken for granted and more something which had to be forged. In his close reading of 
Locke’s work, Uday Mehta finds that the liberal citizen-subject capable of the free pursuit 
of self-interest was not a premise of Locke’s thought, but rather something he thought had 
to be forged through ‘careful and detailed pedagogical crafting’.37 Instead of seeing Locke 
and liberalism as articulating the framework and institutions through which a pent-up 
36. On this, see James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990).
37. Uday Singh Mehta, Anxiety of Freedom: Imagination and Individuality in Locke’s Political Thought 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 13.
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natural individuality finds expression, Mehta urges that we recognise that Locke and 
liberalism were ‘involved in constructing a particular form and venue for individuality’.38 
Others have also sought to show that the free, equal, rational and unitary individual 
presumed by the social sciences as an incontestable fact is no such thing; like the nation 
and state, s/he is a product of processes and discourses. The prime source for such ‘scep-
tical’ modes of thinking is of course Nietzsche, who in Genealogy of Morals and other 
writings argued that the individual capable of making promises, seeing in effects a con-
sequence of the exercise of the will and feeling guilt was forged on the anvil of Greek 
philosophy, Christian morality and Roman law. Partly inspired by Nietzsche’s work, 
Foucault’s writings have in turn influenced those who have similarly sought to show how 
the individual was produced, including being produced by the knowledges which posited 
him, rather than ‘discovered’ by a knowledge which finally recognised what had always 
been there, waiting to be unveiled (as in Jacob Burckhardt’s classic account in which the 
‘veil’ which made man ‘conscious of himself only as a member of a race, people, party, 
family or corporation’ finally lifted in Renaissance Italy, enabling man to recognise him-
self as a ‘spiritual individual’39). In contrast and contestation with accounts which trace 
the emergence into sunlight of the individual subject who had once been shrouded in 
darkness (but who nonetheless had always been there, awaiting discovery), there are now 
accounts which trace the creation of this individual through various historical processes, 
including social, economic and discursive transformations.40
If Nietzsche, Freud, Foucault and others have offered critiques of some of the founding 
presumptions and basic categories of the human sciences, calling their seeming natural-
ness and incontestability into question, scholars working on the non-Western world have 
often simply encountered their ‘empirical’ inadequacy. In his recent, magisterial book on 
culture and power in pre-modern India, Sheldon Pollock argues that the social sciences: 
have their origins in the West in capitalism and modernity and were devised to make sense of 
the behaviour of power and culture under Western capitalist modernity.… These are the 
particulars from which larger universalizations have typically been produced, in association 
with the universalization of Western power under colonialism and globalization.41
However, because it derives from: 
a historically very peculiar, temporally very thin, and spatially very narrow slice of human 
history … [t]he theory developed from that history fails to help us understand, and even 
impedes us from seeing, what did happen elsewhere and how this might differ from what 
38. Mehta, Anxiety of Freedom, 169.
39. Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, trans. S.C.G. Middlemore (New York: 
Mentor, 1960), 121.
40. See, for instance, T.C. Heller, M. Sosna and D.E. Wellbery, eds, Reconstructing Individualism (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1986); Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul: Shaping of the Private 
Self (London: Free Association Books, 2nd revised edn, 1999) and ‘Authority and the Genealogy of 
Subjectivity’, in Detraditionalization, eds P. Heelas, S. Lash and P. Morris (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 
1995); Roy Porter, ed., Rewriting the Self (London: Routledge, 1997).
41. Sheldon Pollock, The Language of the Gods in the World of Men: Sanskrit, Culture, and Power in 
Premodern India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 33.
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eventually produced the peculiar combination of culture and power in the modern world called 
the nation-state.42
In a similar vein, but reflecting upon the contemporary politics of the Third World, 
Sudipta Kaviraj observes: 
The language of modern politics is astonishingly and misleadingly universal. Wherever we go 
in the Third World, we meet socialists, liberals, a suspiciously high number of democrats of all 
kinds, nationalists of all varieties, federalists and centralists. Yet, much of the time, their actual 
behaviour is quite substantially different from what we are led to expect by the long-established 
meanings of these terms in Western political and social thought. In studying Third World 
politics, therefore, we face … a serious mismatch between the language that describes this 
world, and the objects which inhabit it … not [just] single isolated ideas but entire languages 
seem to be composed of systematically misleading expressions.43
The conclusion to be drawn is neither that a recalcitrant reality must be forced into these 
categories, nor that these categories are ‘merely’ Western and must be supplemented or 
replaced by an Indian social science, a Chinese one and so on. Postcolonial writings, 
working at the junction of a keen awareness of this empirical mismatch, on the one hand, 
and with a receptivity to the linguistic turn and to poststructuralist insights, on the other, 
have been especially open to the idea that knowledges may serve to constitute the worlds 
that they purportedly ‘represent’, ‘mirror’, ‘render’ or ‘portray’. Thus, Timothy Mitchell 
argues that the distinction between real and representation, central to modern Western 
ways of apprehending and organising the world, and thus central to how the French and 
British colonisers sought to make sense of Egypt and rule it, did not make much sense 
to the people of Egypt, who did not inhabit a world organised around this distinction. In 
a similar vein, I have argued that many of the discourses that came to centre around the 
introduction of Western knowledge in colonial India – the complaint that Indian students 
were absorbing the new knowledge in their old ways, by rote learning, or the anxiety 
that educated Indians were in the throes of a moral crisis, ‘torn’ between their traditional 
beliefs and the new ideas they were exposed to at school and university – should be read 
less as testifying to real problems and more as indicating that certain foundational 
assumptions of modern knowledge could not, in fact, be assumed in India. I read these 
complaints and anxieties as indicating that the foundational assumptions that underlie 
them – that knowledge is a relation between a meaning-endowing subject and a world of 
disenchanted objects (which is why knowledge has to be made one’s own, and rote 
learning is a failure of knowledge rather than a form of it), and that morality is a matter 
of ‘beliefs’ held in something called the ‘mind’ (hence why Western-educated Indians 
were assumed to be suffering moral crisis, even though most of them seemed blissfully 
unaware of this fact) – did not have purchase in India. However, as the institutions and 
practices of colonial administration, and, not least, of modern knowledge itself, trans-
formed life-worlds in India and Egypt, the social sciences became more adequate as 
42. Pollock, Language of the Gods, 564.
43. Sudipta Kaviraj, ‘In Search of Civil Society’, in Civil Society: History and Possibilities, eds Sudipta 
Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 289.
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tools for ‘representing’ that changed scene. As the distinction between the real and 
representation became the grid organising collective life, it assumed a certain reality and 
now became meaningful in a way that it had not previously been; as the subject–object 
relation came to undergird not only pedagogy, but the spatial layout of the city and the 
practices of the law court and the office, some Indians became subjects who did experi-
ence morality and religion as beliefs and were now capable of being rent by the conflict 
between different beliefs.44
The free, equal, rational and unitary individual is not a fact of the world, the starting 
point of knowledge, but rather a consequence or product which has been naturalised such 
that it can seem to be a fact. The elements which have produced it as a fact include those 
knowledges and discourses which purport to simply recognise and represent the fact that 
they have helped to produce. It is not that the individual is real and that culture and nation 
are cobbled together and contingent, but rather that the former has stabilised, and the 
marks of its manufacture have, over time, been erased; such is not the case with state and 
nation, which continue to be contingent and contested, with the struggles that went into 
their making often still inscribed on their bodies. Liberal political theory, one could say, 
has had more success in naturalising the individual than mainstream IR theory has had in 
naturalising state, nation and the international order. 
Conclusion
These insights are the fruit of a variety of intellectual currents, and it is certainly not my 
intention to ‘claim’ these for postcolonial theory alone. The critique of mainstream IR 
takes many versions, and I have freely and gratefully drawn upon some of these in this 
article. But postcolonial theory has been especially sensitive and attentive to the role of 
knowledge not simply as a ‘mirror’ which represents the ‘real’, but also as a potent force 
for shaping what is ‘out there’ – and has been especially sensitive to the many circum-
stances in which knowledges born in Europe are inadequate to their non-European 
object. In this, it should share a certain affinity with any discipline devoted to relation-
ship, interconnection, diversity and discontinuity, such as IR. For ‘the international’ is a 
realm where endless and seemingly irresolvable contestations – over meanings and mor-
als as much as resources and power – testify to the fact that few things have become so 
naturalised that they are not potentially subject to contestation, few presumptions so 
stabilised that they are not periodically destabilised. In this regard, there is something to 
the importance accorded to the sovereignty–anarchy distinction, even if not in the sense 
that mainstream IR usually draws it. In what is still one of the most illuminating texts on 
the subject, Leviathan, Hobbes shows that sovereignty is the name and form of a capacity 
to impose and stabilise meanings. It is always a function of strategies and tactics, strug-
gles and conflicts, and, to that degree, is contingent and variable. This becomes espe-
cially apparent in the international realm, where no sovereignty has yet succeeded in 
imposing stable meanings.
44. Sanjay Seth, Subject Lessons: The Western Education of Colonial India (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2007).
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For an outsider to IR such as myself, this is precisely what makes ‘the international’ 
especially interesting – interesting for the light it sheds on questions which are of broad 
political, theoretical and epistemological importance. But in my readings within the dis-
cipline, I find a great deal of IR theory is an obstacle to a recognition and exploration of 
this, rather than a guide to it, for it seems content to naturalise what it could problematise, 
and to assume that which it should deconstruct: whence the need for its critique. 
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